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OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JESSE BROWN, by and 
through his guardian 
ad litem, 
JEFFERY BROWN, 
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Appellant, 
vs. 
KEVIN K. LOH, JOSEPH 
PLUTA, NORMAN LIWANAG, 
EUGENE LONG, and THOMAS 
M. FOLEY, dba THE KNIGHT 
BLOCK PARTNERSHIP, a 
Hawaii general partnership, 
Defendants-
Respondents, 
Case No. 870387 
Category 14b 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from the Judgment of the Fourth Judicial 
District Court of Utah County, dated September 10, 1987, which 
granted the defendants' Motion to Dismiss. This Court has 
jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3)(i) (1987). 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
May a plaintiff recover damages from a defendant when the 
defendant has negligently inflicted severe emotional distress 
upon the plaintiff? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES. RULES. OR REGULATIONS 
The plaintiff is unaware of any constitutional provision, 
statute, rule, or regulation that is determinative of the issue 
presented for review. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The plaintiff filed this action against the defendants to 
recover damages for the severe emotional distress that was 
negligently inflicted upon the plaintiff's minor son by the 
defendants. Arguing that the plaintiff's complaint failed to 
state a claim for which relief could be granted, the defendants 
filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), 
which was granted on September 10, 1987. The plaintiff filed 
this appeal on October 13, 1987. 
On Saturday, August 2, 1986, Jesse Brown1, then 10 years 
old (R. 5), and JoeDee2 Quinn entered the defendants' building, 
the Knight Block Building, located at #1 East Center Street, 
Provo, Utah, to ride the elevator. (R. 4, para. 4.) The 
elevator's construction makes it possible for a child to 
position himself between the elevator's inner door and the 
access door to watch the operation of the elevator while it 
xJesse Brown is the minor son of Jeffery Brown, the 
Appellant herein. Jeffery Brown has been duly appointed as the 
guardian ad litem for Jesse with respect to this action. (R. 9.) 
2The complaint uses the spelling of "Jody." (R. 2.) The 
death certificate in the files of the plaintiff's attorneys, 
however, reveals that the correct spelling is "JoeDee," and that 
he was 13 years old at the time of his death. 
2 
ascends to another floor.3 (R. 2 para. 9.) The defendants knew 
information in the files of the plaintiff's attorneys 
reveals that the elevator's outer door swings from the right 
into the hallway. The elevator's inner door is made of vertical 
tubes that are secured at the top, center, and bottom by a 
series of brackets. The elevator services the basement floor, 
the main floor, the first floor, and the second floor. When 
located at the basement floor, the space between the outer and 
inner doors is approximately seven inches wide, which narrows to 
approximately three and one-half inches on the main floor. 
The elevator is an old model, and is located in the Knight 
Block Building, an old building in the center of Provo which was 
renovated and converted into office space while still maintain-
ing its rustic character. The elevator had last been inspected 
nearly three and a half years before the accident. Children had 
been frequently observed to play on the elevator without 
supervision or control. 
On August 2, 1986, Jesse and JoeDee had been riding the 
elevator up and down for a period of approximately two hours, 
and became curious about how the elevator operated. JoeDee 
discovered that he could stand between the outer and inner doors 
of the elevator and observe the elevator operate within the 
elevator shaft. After placing himself between the doors, JoeDee 
instructed Jesse, who was still located inside the elevator, to 
press the main floor button, thereby causing the elevator to 
rise. As the elevator rose to the main floor, the seven inch 
space narrowed to three and one-half inches, wedging JoeDee's 
body between the elevator shaft wall and the elevator, which 
crushed his legs and waist. 
As the elevator began to crush him, • JoeDee cried out in 
pain to Jesse, who was frantically pressing the emergency stop 
button. Unfortunately, the button did not work and the elevator 
continued to rise while Jesse looked on in horror and shock. 
Finally, the force exerted by the wedging of JoeDee's body 
caused a fuse to blow and the elevator stopped. Jesse im-
mediately cried out for help and tried to speak with JoeDee, who 
was then only able to whisper. Within two minutes, JoeDee was 
silent; shortly thereafter, JoeDee was dead. 
It was at least fifteen minutes before anyway responded to 
Jesse's frantic cries for help. During that time, Jesse was 
trapped inside the elevator cage. Jesse talked to JoeDee for 
the few minutes until he became silent, and could reach down and 
touch him, but was powerless to help. Emergency workers 
eventually arrived and began the laborious process of rescuing 
Jesse and freeing JoeDee's body. Jesse observed most of the 
rescue efforts. He continues to suffer from sleeplessness, 
nightmares, an abnormal refusal to associate with friends, fear 
and anguish associated with elevators which causes him to relive 
the ordeal, and other problems related to the trauma he experienced. 
3 
or should have known that children might engage in such activity 
to satisfy their curiosity regarding the operation of the 
elevator, and that children would thereby be exposed to risk of 
serious injury or death. (R. 3. para. 10.) 
JoeDee placed himself between the doors of the elevator 
while Jesse operated the controls to move the elevator to the 
next floor. JoeDee became wedged between the elevator's inner 
door and the wall of the elevator shaft, and was crushed to 
death. (R. 3 para. 11.) 
Jesse rode the elevator with JoeDee, observed JoeDee 
between the elevator's doors, witnessed JoeDee's death, and 
observed the unsuccessful rescue efforts. All of this served to 
injure and traumatize him and to cause severe emotional distress 
and damage. Jesse continued to suffer from having witnessed the 
traumatic and gruesome death of his best fr.iend—that is, Jesse 
suffered from the emotional trauma that was induced by the 
severe psychological and mental distress occasioned by JoeDee's 
death. (R. 3 para. 13.) 
The plaintiff filed this action to recover damages from the 
defendants for the emotional distress that was inflicted upon 
Jesse as a result of the defendants' negligent maintenance of, 
and supervision over, the elevator. (R. 3 para. 12.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The issue of whether Utah recognizes a cause of action for 
negligently inflicted emotional injury has never been directly 
addressed and analyzed by this Court. The trial court granted 
4 
the defendants1 Motion to Dismiss based on the assertion in 
Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982), that Utah does not 
recognize such a cause of action. That statement was not, 
however, necessary to the holding in Reiser, and was in turn 
based on dicta from two earlier Utah cases. 
To the extent that prior decisions of this Court do deny 
any redress for negligently inflicted emotional injury, those 
decisions should be overruled. Every other state in the nation 
recognizes a cause of action for negligently inflicted emotional 
injury. The cases generally arise in the context of emotional 
injury incurred by witnessing severe injury to or death of 
another person, and can be grouped under three main categories. 
Six states follow the Impact Rule, and allow recovery only if 
the plaintiff suffered a physical impact or physical conse-
quences from the emotional injury. Nine states allow bystander 
recovery only for plaintiffs who were in the same zone of danger 
as the person physically injured. The growing majority of 
states, 34 to date, apply the same rule as used in other areas 
of tort law, and allow recovery for foreseeable injuries. 
The Impact and Zone of Danger Rules are grounded in 
antiquated notions of the difficulty of proving or defending 
against emotional injuries and on an unfounded fear of a flood 
of litigation. Only the Foreseeability Rule can be logically 
supported in light of modern abilities to analyze and measure 
emotional injuries, and in view of the duty of courts to grant 
all injured parties equal rights of redress. This Court should 
5 
join the majority and better-reasoned decisions and adopt the 
Foreseeability Rule. 
ARGUMENT 
UTAH SHOULD ADOPT THE FORESEEABILITY RULE OF RECOVERY 
FOR NEGLIGENTLY INFLICTED EMOTIONAL INJURY. 
I. Historical Background 
Seventy-two years ago, this Court recognized a cause of 
action for intentionally inflicted emotional distress in Jeppsen 
v. Jensen, 47 Utah 536, 155 P. 429 (1916) . In obiter dictum, 
however, this Court went on to state that a cause of action for 
negligently inflicted emotional distress was not generally 
recognized: ,f[M]ental suffering, unaccompanied by injury to 
purse or person, affords no basis for an action predicated upon 
wrongful acts, merely negligent . . . .M Id. at 540, 155 P. at 
43 0 (citation omitted). 
This dictum correctly characterized the Nineteenth-
Century's posture toward claims for psychic injury. This 
posture developed simultaneously in England and America. In 
Victorian Railways Commissioners v. Coultas, 13 App. Cas. 222 
(1888), and in Lehman v. Brooklyn City Railroad, 47 Hun. 355, 14 
St. R. 575 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1888), it was held that damages could 
not be recovered for negligently inflicted emotional distress 
unaccompanied by physical injury as such was without precedent. 
Scotland rejected the Coultas decision in Gillicran v. Robb, 
Sess. Cas. 856 (1910), holding that damages could be recovered 
for negligently inflicted nervous shock even in the absence of 
6 
physical impact. Although Ireland had already recognized a 
cause of action for negligently inflicted emotional distress 
without impact in Byrne v, Great Southern & Western Railway of 
Ireland, (unreported), it explicitly repudiated the Coultas 
decision in Bell v, Great Northern Railway of Ireland, 26 
L.R. Ir. 428 (1890) . See Throckmorton, Damages for Fright, 34 
Harv. L. Rev. 260 (1920-21). England itself finally abandoned 
the Coultas decision in Dulieu v. White & Sons, 2 K.B. 669 
(1901), and held that a person could recover for negligently 
inflicted nervous shock without physical impact. 
In America, however, the holding in Lehman, which denied 
recovery for psychic injury without physical impact, "became the 
weight of American authority of the late 1890's." First 
National Bank v. Langley, 314 So. 2d 324, 329 (Miss. 1975). 
This authority was the rationale that underlay the dictum 
announced by this Court in Jeppsen and has been embodied in a 
rule that has come to be known as the Impact Rule. 
II. The Impact Rule 
The Impact Rule "provides that only a person who suffers an 
impact from the same force which injures a third person may 
recover for emotional distress due to witnessing the injury to 
the third person." Saechao v. Matsakoun, 78 Or. App. 3 40, 717 
P.2d 165, 167, review dismissed, 302 Or. 155, 727 P.2d 126 
(1986) . The rule was fashioned out of a belief that psychic 
injury claims are too "easily . . . fabricated: or as sometimes 
stated, are easy to assert and hard to defend against." Samms 
7 
V, Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 291, 358 P.2d 344, 345 (1961). 
"[Cjourts generally have not focused on considerations such as 
whether people have some original entitlement to psychic 
well-being. Rather, courts have articulated concerns about 
unlimited liability, false claims, a flood of trivial lawsuits, 
uncertainty of damages and windfall compensation for plain-
tiffs." Bell, The Bell Tolls; Toward Full Tort Recovery For 
Psychic Injury. 36 U. Fla. L. Rev. 333, 347 (1984). The Impact 
Rule is therefore viewed as a physically reliable guarantee of 
psychic injury. 
The cold injustice worked by the Impact Rule can be seen in 
Saechao, wherein the defendant, while attempting to park her 
car, backed over a curb, crushing and killing a two-year old 
child, Ou Fou Saechao. Ou Fou's brother attempted to pull him 
from the car's path, but was struck by the car and knocked away 
from Ou Fou. Also present at a distance of approximately 15 
feet were Ou Fou's sister and another brother. 
Suit was brought on behalf of the three children for the 
extreme emotional trauma, physical trauma, nausea, nightmares, 
and headaches they sustained as a result of the defendant's 
negligence. Based on the Impact Rule, the trial court granted 
the defendant's motion to dismiss as to the sister and brother 
who witnessed Ou Fou's death from a distance of less than 15 
feet, while it denied the motion as to the brother who was 
struck by the car as he attempted to pull Ou Fou from the car's 
path. 
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Reasoning that the defendant breached no duty to Ou Fou's 
onlooking sister and brother, the court of appeals affirmed, 
stating that the Impact Rule "creates a clear relationship 
between compensability and the plaintiff's being a victim of a 
breach of duty." 717 P.2d at 169. Only the brother who was 
physically impacted by the defendant's negligence was permitted 
to recover for his psychic injury, despite the fact that his 
injuries were concededly identical to his bystanding sister and 
brother. 
The Impact Rule thus denies recovery for psychic injuries 
without physical impact on the ground that there is no duty of 
due care. The Impact Rule is premised on a belief that "the 
imposition of duty here would work disaster because it would 
invite fraudulent claims and it would involve the courts in the 
hopeless task of defining the extent of the tortfeasor's 
liability." Dillon v. Legq, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 
441 P.2d 912, 914 (Cal. 1968). 
This rationale erroneously assumes that liability is 
impossible to define and that denying a duty of due care is "the 
only realistic alternative." Id. It "assumes that juries, 
confronted by irreconcilable expert medical testimony, will be 
unable to distinguish the deceitful from the bona fide," and 
that "only a per se rule denying the entire class of claims that 
potentially raises this administrative problem can avoid this 
danger." Id. at 917. 
9 
As the court in Dillon noted, however: "[T]he possibility 
that fraudulent assertions may prompt recovery in isolated cases 
does not justify a wholesale rejection of the entire class of 
claims in which that potentiality arises." Id. at 917-18. "The 
possibility that some fraud will escape detection does not 
justify an abdication of the judicial responsibility to award 
damages for sound claims . . . ." Id. at 918. In the words of 
the Supreme Court of Connecticut: "Certainly it is a very ques-
tionable position for a court to take, that because of the 
possibility of encouraging fictitious claims compensation should 
be denied those who have actually suffered serious injury 
through the negligence of another." Orlo v. Connecticut Co., 
128 Conn. 231, 21 A.2d 402, 405 (1941). This Court has also 
stated the same principle: 
It is further to be observed that the argument 
against allowing such an action because groundless 
charges may be made is not a good reason for denying 
recovery. If the right to recover for injury result-
ing from the wrongful conduct could be defeated when-
ever such dangers exist, many of the grievances the 
law deals with would be eliminated. That some claims 
may be spurious should not compel those who administer 
justice to shut their eyes to serious wrongs and let 
them go without being brought to account. It is the 
function of courts and juries to determine whether 
claims are valid or false. This responsibility should 
not be shunned merely because the task may be dif-
ficult to perform. 
Samms, 358 P.2d at 347. 
In the wake of such reasoning, followers of the Impact Rule 
have fallen away. "[T]he great majority of courts have now 
repudiated the requirement of ' i m p a c t ' . . . . " Prosser and 
Keeton on the Law of Torts (hereinafter Law of Torts) § 54 at 
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364 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984). For a list of the states that 
have abolished the Impact Rule, see Gates v, Richardson, 719 
P.2d 193, 195 n.l (Wyo. 1986). 
Moreover, scholars have pointed out that denying liability 
for psychic injuries unaccompanied by physical impact on the 
ground that there is no duty of due care begs the ultimate 
question—whether an individual's interest in psychic well-being 
is entitled to legal protection. Common sense alone belies the 
notion that psychological stability and mental tranquility are 
trivial and dispensable. "Psychic well-being is the core of 
what is important to human existence and is too important to the 
individual to surrender." 36 U. Fla. L. Rev. at 342. 
"[F]reedom from mental distress is an interest that is today 
worthy of legal protection." Corso v. Merrill. 119 N.H. 647, 
406 A.2d 300, 304 (1979). 
In our increasingly complex society, the orderly 
and normal functioning of a man's mind is as critical 
to his well-being as physical health. Indeed, a sound 
mind within a disabled body can accomplish much, while 
a disabled mind in the soundest of bodies is rarely 
capable of making any substantial contribution to 
society. 
Comment, Negligently Inflicted Mental Distress; The Case for an 
Independent Tort. 59 Geo. L.J. 1237 (1970-71). 
With respect to duty, Professor Prosser has correctly 
observed that duty is merely a legal conclusion: "'[D]uty! is 
not sacrosanct in itself, but is only an expression of the sum 
total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to 
say that the plaintiff is entitled to protection." Law of Torts 
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§ 53, at 358. These policy considerations played a critical 
role in the development of the concept of duty. "In the absence 
of 'overriding policy considerations . . . foreseeability of 
risk [is] of . . . primary importance in establishing the 
element of duty.1" Dillon, 441 P.2d at 919, (quoting Grafton 
v. Mollica, 231 Cal. App. 2d 860, 42 Cal. Rptr. 306, 310 
(1965)). It has long been accepted that M[t]he risk reasonably 
to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed.11 Palsaraf 
v. Long Island Railroad Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99, 100 
(N.Y. 1928). 
Most courts today have abandoned the Impact Rule and 
adopted the notion of foreseeability as the touchstone of duty. 
This approach is known as the Foreseeability Rule; it permits a 
person to recover damages for negligently inflicted emotional 
distress without impact if the damages sustained were reasonably 
foreseeable. The physical impact requirement has come to be 
chastised as an artificial barrier with no place in Twentieth 
Century jurisprudence.4 
Today, only the following six jurisdictions still adhere to 
the Impact Rule: Arkansas: Midwest Buslines, Inc. v. Johnson, 
291 Ark. 304, 724 S.W.2d 453 (1987); Georgia: Hamilton 
4The artificial nature of the barrier is demonstrated by 
the extent to which courts will strain to find an "impact." The 
Supreme Court of South Dakota, for example, while not deciding 
which rule it would follow, recently held that even under the 
Impact Rule, recovery would be allowed for emotional injury 
where the only physical "impact" was nausea and diarrhea. 
Wright v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Central South Dakota, Inc., 
414 N.W.2d 608 (S.D. 1987). 
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v, Powell. Goldstein. Frazer & Murphy. 252 Ga. 149, 311 S.E.2d 
818 (Ga. 1984); Indiana: Boston v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway 
Co. . 223 Ind. 425, 61 N.E. 2d 326 (1945); Kentucky: Deutsch 
v. Shein. 597 S.W.2d 141 (Ky. 1980); Oregon5: Saechao 
v. Matsakoun. 78 Or. App. 340, 717 P.2d 165, review dismissed. 
302 Or. 155, 727 P.2d 126 (1986); and Washington, D.C.: Waldon 
v. Covington. 415 A.2d 1070 (D.C. App. 1980). 
The Oregon Supreme Court, however, has stated that it has 
"not had occasion to examine the bystander's claim for psychic 
injury from witnessing a negligent physical injury to a close 
relative . . . and we therefore exclude it from the pertinent 
analogues in Oregon." Norwest v. Presbyterian Intercommunity 
Hospital. 293 Or. 543, 652 P.2d 318, 327 n.18 (1982). Likewise, 
the Washington, D.C, Court of Appeals has indicated that it, en 
banc, could overrule the Impact Rule. Asuncion v. Columbia 
Hospital for Women. 514 A.2d 1187 (D.C. App. 1986). 
III. The Zone of Danger Rule 
Some courts that have abandoned the Impact Rule have 
stopped short of the Foreseeability Rule by adopting the Zone of 
Danger Rule, which permits a person to recover damages for 
negligently inflicted emotional distress without impact if the 
person was within the zone of physical danger when the psychic 
5It should be observed, however, that Oregon has created an 
exception to the Impact Rule, which permits a plaintiff to 
recover damages for negligently inflicted emotional distress 
unaccompanied by physical impact when the plaintiff is the 
direct victim of the defendant's tortious conduct. Harris v. 
Kisslina. 721 P.2d 838, 840 (Or. App. 1986). 
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injury occurred. Courts adopting the Foreseeability Rule have 
correctly noted that the Zone of Danger Rule is simply another 
artificial barrier, which, like the Impact Rule, has no place in 
today's society. 
The unwarranted injustice worked by the Zone of Danger Rule 
can be seen in Dillon, wherein the defendant negligently drove 
his car into Erin Dillon as she crossed Clover Lane, thereby 
causing her death. Erin's sister was standing on the curb, and 
her mother a few yards back, when the defendant's car struck 
Erin. Both sustained extreme emotional shock and injury. 
The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary 
judgment as to the mother, dismissing her claim for psychic 
injury on the ground that she was not personally within the zone 
of physical danger, but denied the motion as to Erin's sister. 
The California Supreme Court was repulsed by this bizarre 
result: "[W]e can hardly justify relief to the sister for 
trauma which she suffered upon apprehension of [Erin's] death 
and yet deny it to the mother merely because of a happenstance 
that the sister was some few yards closer to the accident." 441 
P.2d at 915. The court went on to reject the Zone of Danger 
Rule. 
The Zone of Danger Rule has been critically analyzed by the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court: 
The problem with the zone of danger rule . . . is that 
it is an inadequate measure of the reasonable foresee-
ability of the possibility of physical injury result-
ing from a parent's anxiety arising from harm to his 
child. The reasonable foreseeability of such a 
physical injury to a parent does not turn on whether 
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the parent was or was not a reasonable prospect for a 
contemporaneous injury because of the defendant's 
negligent conduct. Although the zone of danger rule 
tends to produce more reasonable results than the 
[impact] rule and provides a means of limiting the 
scope of a defendant's liability, it lacks strong 
logical support. 
Dziokonski v. Babineau, 375 Mass. 555, 380 N.E.2d 1295, 1300 
(1978). 
In place of the Zone of Danger Rule, the California Supreme 
Court adopted the Foreseeability Rule. The Dillon decision has 
come to be viewed as the seminal decision in this area of the 
law; it has served as the guiding decision for the 
near-universal adoption of the Foreseeability Rule in contem-
porary America. 
Today, only the following nine jurisdictions still adhere 
to the Zone of Danger Rule: Arizona: Keck v. Jackson, 122 
Ariz. 114, 593 P.2d 668 (1979); Colorado: Towns v. Anderson, 
195 Colo. 517, 579 P.2d 1163 (1978); Delaware: Robb v. Pennsyl-
vania Railroad Co., 58 Del. 454, 210 A.2d 709 (1965); Illinois: 
Rickey v. Chicago Transit Authority, 98 111. 2d 546, 457 N.E.2d 
1 (1983); Minnesota: Stadler v. Cross, 295 N.W.2d 552 
(Minn. 1980); New York: Bovsun v. Sanoeri. 61 N.Y.2d 219, 473 
N.Y.S.2d 357, 461 N.E.2d 843 (1984); North Dakota: Whetham 
v. Bismarck Hospital, 197 N.W.2d 678 (N.D. 1972); Tennessee: 
Shelton v. Russell Pipe & Foundry Co. , 570 S.W.2d 861 
(Tenn. 1978); Vermont: Vaillancourt v. Medical Center Hospital 
of Vermont, Inc., 139 Ut. 138, 425 A.2d 92 (1980). 
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Although Wisconsin follows the Zone of Danger Rule, it has 
created an exception under the Foreseeability Rule for plain-
tiffs within the scope of the defendant's tortious activity even 
though unendangered. Garrett v. City of New Berlin, 122 Wis. 2d 
223, 362 N.W.2d 137 (1985). 
IV. The Foreseeability Rule 
Today, the Foreseeability Rule is the majority approach for 
compensating claimants for psychic injury. This rule has been 
adopted by most of the jurisdictions that have considered the 
issue presented by this appeal. The Foreseeability Rule 
requires courts to focus upon certain factors on a case-by-case 
basis to determine whether the plaintiff was emotionally trauma-
tized by the defendant's negligent conduct. In the words of the 
Dillon court: "The evaluation of these factors will indicate 
the degree of the defendant's foreseeability." 441 P. 2d at 
92 0. The Dillon court identified three factors to be considered 
when applying the Foreseeability Rule: 
(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of 
the accident as contrasted with one who was a distance 
away from it. (2) Whether the shock resulted from a 
direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the 
sensory and contemporaneous observance of the acci-
dent, as contrasted with learning of the accident from 
others after its occurrence. (3) Whether plaintiff 
and the victim were closely related, as contrasted 
with an absence of any relationship or the presence of 
only a distant relationship. 
Id. 
The above-described factors are not mandatory requirements, 
but meaningful indicators to be considered when determining the 
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foreseeable results of a defendant's negligent conduct. In the 
words of the Ohio Supreme Court: 
Concomitant with this test of foreseeability, we 
add several factors which should be considered in 
order to determine the reasonable foreseeability of a 
negligently inflicted emotional injury to a plaintiff-
bystander. These factors are by no means exclusive, 
and the mere failure of a plaintiff to satisfy all of 
them should not preclude an aggrieved party from 
recovery. Thus, the term "factors" should be under-
scored to alleviate any misconception that such 
factors are requirements. The purpose of these 
factors is to assist and guide the determination of 
whether the serious emotional injury was1 reasonably 
foreseeable to the defendant at the time the accident 
(which precipitated the cause of action) took place. 
Pauah v. Hanks. 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, 451 N.E.2d 759, 766 (1983). 
With respect to the first factor, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court has made the following observation: 
Discovering the death or serious injury of an 
intimate family member will always be expected to 
threaten one's emotional welfare. Ordinarily, 
however, only a witness at the scene of the accident 
causing death or serious injury will suffer a trau-
matic sense of loss that may destroy his sense of 
security and cause severe emotional distress. 
Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88, 417 A.2d 521, 527 (1980) (emphasis 
added). 
The Wyoming Supreme Court has acknowledged that this factor 
properly limits the class of plaintiffs: 
The essence of the tort is the shock caused by 
the perception of an especially horrendous event. It 
is more than the shock one suffers when he learns of 
the death or injury of a child, sibling or parent over 
the phone, from a witness, or at the hospital. It is 
more than bad news. The kind of shock the tort 
requires is the result of the immediate aftermath of 
an accident. 
Gates, 719 P.2d at 199 (citations omitted). 
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With respect to the second factor, the Wyoming Supreme 
Court has observed the following: 
As an assurance of genuine shock, the courts that have 
adopted the tort have generally agreed that the person 
claiming emotional harm must witness a serious 
accident or its aftermath. The primary victim must, 
in fact, be seriously injured or killed and the 
claimant must realize, at the time he witnesses the 
event, that the injuries are serious. 
Id. 
The Ohio Supreme Court has added the following variation to 
this factor: 
As far as the second factor is concerned, we believe 
that it is not necessary for a plaintiff to actually 
see the accident. Thus, for example, a contemporan-
eous observance of the accident through the sense of 
hearing will enhance the likelihood that the emotional 
injury was reasonably foreseeable. 
Paugh, 451 N.E.2d at 766. 
The Ohio Supreme Court has perfected the third factor by 
implementing the following refinement: 
With respect to the third factor, we believe that a 
strict blood relationship between the accident victim 
and the plaintiff-bystander is not necessarily 
required. 
Id. at 766-67. 
The Hawaii Supreme Court follows this rationale: 
It is well established, in this jurisdiction, 
that one has a duty to refrain (duty of care) from the 
negligent infliction of serious emotional distress 
upon another. This court has further concluded that 
in connection with such a duty, relief for the 
plaintiff exists regardless of the absence of physical 
impact and resulting physical injury on the plaintiff 
and the absence of blood relationship between the 
victim and plaintiff. 
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Kelley v, Kokua Sales and Supply, Ltd,f 56 Hawaii 204, 532 P.2d 
673, 675 (Hawaii 1975) (citations omitted). 
By combining these three factors, the Wyoming Supreme 
Court has observed that the class of plaintiffs is properly 
limited to those truly meritorious claimants. 
A timely example is the space shuttle disaster. If 
every person who witnessed that catastrophic event and 
suffered mental harm could recover, the courts would 
be overwhelmed and such projects as the space shuttle 
would be laden with insuperable risk. As a society, 
we must tell most of those who observed the disaster 
and may have suffered because of it, that it is 
suffering that is not compensable. In this we 
recognize that part of living involves some unhappy 
and disagreeable emotions with which we must cope 
without recovery of damages. 
Gates, 719 P.2d at 198. 
Thus, the Foreseeability Rule employs the traditional and 
time-honored approach announced in Palsaraf that lf[t]he risk 
reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed.11 162 
N.E. at 100. This approach anticipates that "foreseeability of 
risk [is] of . . . primary importance in establishing the 
element of duty." Grafton, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 310. By carefully 
analyzing and applying the above-described factors, the Foresee-
ability Rule reliably and predictably indicates the reasonably 
foreseeable results of a defendant's negligent conduct. 
The persuasive justice worked by the Foreseeability Rule 
thus framed can be seen in Portee, wherein two children were 
riding an elevator, one of whom was the plaintiff's seven-year-
-old son, Guy Portee. Like the facts in this action, Guy noted 
that he could place himself between the outer and inner doors of 
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the elevator. After so doing, the elevator was activated and 
Guy was dragged upward between the elevator shaft and the 
elevator. 
The other child was located outside the elevator and raced 
up a nearby stairway to meet the elevator on the next floor. 
Upon opening the door, he saw the crushed body of Guy. Guy's 
mother arrived immediately thereafter and witnessed the ex-
cruciating pain suffered by Guy, who flailed his arms and moaned 
for help. Rescue efforts were unsuccessful and Guy died while 
the plaintiff helplessly looked on. The plaintiff thereafter 
suffered severe depression and extreme psychological trauma as a 
result of the horrifying episode. The plaintiff brought suit 
for, among other claims, the severe emotional distress that she 
"suffered as a result of the defendant's negligence. 
Because the plaintiff was not personally within the zone of 
danger, the trial court granted the defendant's motion for 
summary judgment. The New Jersey Supreme Court abandoned the 
Zone of Danger Rule, adopting instead the Foreseeability Rule 
and stating: 
Our inquiry has led us to conclude that the interest 
in personal emotional stability is worthy of legal 
protection against unreasonable conduct. The emotion-
al harm following the perception of the death or 
serious injury to a loved one is just as foreseeable 
as the injury itself, for few persons travel through 
life alone. Ultimately we must decide whether 
protecting these emotional interests outweighs an 
interest against burdening freedom of conduct by 
imposing a new species of negligence liability. We 
believe that the interest in emotional stability we 
have described is sufficiently important to warrant 
this protection. 
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Portee, 417 A.2d at 528. 
The Foreseeability Rule thus achieves a predictable outcome 
and a just result. Historically, the concept of foreseeability 
has been utilized in every field of tort law except the field of 
negligently inflicted emotional distress, which has, unfortuna-
tely, been subjected, and continues to be subjected, to such 
artificial barriers as the Impact Rule and the Zone of Danger 
Rule. The Foreseeability Rule remedies this flaw by requiring a 
complete analysis of the circumstances presented by each case to 
determine whether the plaintiff's psychic injury was a reason-
ably foreseeable result of the defendant's negligence. 
Today, the Foreseeability Rule is followed in every 
remaining jurisdiction, thirty-four in all: Alabama: Taylor 
v. Baptist Medical Center, Inc.. 400 So. 2d 369 (Ala. 1981); 
Alaska: Tommy's Elbow Room, Inc. v. Kavorkian, 727 P.2d 1038 
(Alaska 1986); California: Dillon v. Legq, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 69 
Cal. Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912 (1968); Connecticut: Montinieri 
v. Southern New England Telephone Co., 175 Conn. 337, 398 A.2d 
1180 (1978) ; Florida: Champion v. Gray, 478 So. 2d 17 
(Fla. 1985); Idaho: Hatfield v. Max Rouse & Sons Northwest, 100 
Idaho 840, 606 P.2d 944 (1980); Iowa: Barnhill v. Davis, 300 
N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1981); Hawaii: Kellev v. Kokua Sales & Supply 
Ltd. , 56 Hawaii 204, 532 P.2d 673 (1975); Kansas: Hoard 
v. Shawnee Mission Medical Center, 233 Kan. 267, 662 P.2d 1214 
(1983); Louisiana: Todd v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 219 
So. 2d 538 (La. 1969); Mesa v. Burke, 506 So. 2d 121 (La. App.), 
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cert, denied, 506 So.2d 1226 (La. 1987); Maine: Rowe v. Ben-
nett, 514 A.2d 802 (Me. 1986); Maryland: Vance v. Vance, 286 
Md. 490, 408 A.2d 728 (1979); Massachusetts: Dziokonski 
v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (Mass. 1978); Michigan: Warcrelin 
v. Sisters of Mercy Health Corp., 385 N.W.2d 732 (Mich 
App. 1986) ; Mississippi: First National Bank v. Langley, 314 
So. 2d 324 (1975); Missouri: Bass v. Nooney Co., 646 S.W.2d 765 
(Mo. 1983); Montana: Versland v. Caron Transport, 671 P.2d 583 
(Mont. 1983); Nebraska: James v. Lieb, 375 N.W.2d 109 
(Neb. 1985); Nevada: Selsnick v. Horton, 620 P.2d 1256 
(Nev. 1980); New Hampshire: Corso v. Merrill, 406 A.2d 300 
(N.H. 1979); New Jersey: Portee v. Jaffee. 417 A.2d 521 
(N.J. 1980); New Mexico: Ramirez v. Armstrong, 100 N.M. 538, 
673 P.2d 822 (1983); North Carolina: Ledford v. Martin, 359 
S.E.2d 505 (N.C. App. 1987); Ohio: Pauah v. Hanks, 451 N.E.2d 
759 (Ohio 1983); Oklahoma: Ellington v. Coca Cola Bottling 
Co. of Tulsa, Inc., 717 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1982); Pennsylvania: 
Sinn v. Burd, 404 A.2d 672 (Pa. 1979); Rhode Island: DfAmbra 
v. United States, 338 A.2d 524 (R.I. 1975); South Carolina: 
Kinard v. Augusta Sash & Door Co. , 336 S.E.2d 465 (S.C. 1985); 
South Dakota:6 Wright v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Central 
South Dakota, Inc., 414 N.W.2d 608 (S.D. 1987); Texas: St. Eli-
6South Dakota has not directly addressed the question of 
whether it would recognize a cause of action for negligently 
inflicted emotional injury where there are no physical symptoms. 
It appears from the cited case, however, that South Dakota would 
adopt the foreseeability rule if the issue were directly 
presented. 
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zabeth Hospital v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. 1987); Vir-
ginia: Hughes v. Moore, 197 S.E.2d 214 (Va. 1973); Washington: 
Hunslev v. Girard, 87 Wash. 2d 424, 553 P.2d 1096 (1976); West 
Virginia: Harless v. First National Bank in Fairmont, 289 
S.E.2d 692 (W. Va. 1982); and Wyoming: Gates v. Richardson, 719 
P.2d 193 (Wyo. 1986). 
V. Negligently Inflicted Emotional Injury in Utah 
With the possible exception of Utah, therefore, every state 
in the nation, as well as the District of Columbia, recognizes a 
cause of action for negligently inflicted emotional distress. 
The rule employed by each state has been heretofore identified. 
With respect to Utah, however, it is unclear whether such a 
cause of action even exists. The dictum in Jeppsen indicated 
that a person could recover damages for negligently inflicted 
emotional distress if accompanied by "injury to purse or per-
son.11 47 Utah at 540, 155 P. at 430. This would seem to imply 
that Utah adheres, or would have adhered, to the Impact Rule. 
This dictum next appeared forty-five years later in Samms 
v. Eccles. 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961), which, like 
Jeppsen, involved a claim for intentionally inflicted emotional 
distress. In Samms, this dictum was reiterated when this Court 
stated, again in obiter dictum, that a cause of action "may not 
be based upon mere negligence." Id. at 293, 358 P.2d at 346. 
Twenty-one years later, this twice-repeated dictum served 
as the underlying rationale for Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 
(Utah 1982), which, unlike Jeppsen and Samms, did involved a 
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claim for negligently inflicted emotional distress. In Reiser, 
this Court relied upon Samms and summarily held that, in Utah, 
"a cause of action for emotional distress may not be based upon 
mere negligence." Id. at 100. This statement, like those in 
Jeppsen and Samms, was obiter dictum, for this Court had already 
held that the plaintiff's claims were barred by the statute of 
limitations. Nevertheless, this statement served as the basis 
upon which the trial court granted the defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss in this action. 
In plain terms, the Reiser holding eliminated the right to 
recover damages for negligently inflicted emotional distress 
even if accompanied by physical impact, which is an even more 
draconian approach than that announced in Jeppsen.7 It would 
thus appear that Utah has retreated from, although it never 
adopted, the antiquated Impact Rule articulated in dictum 
seventy-two years ago, thereby making it the only jurisdiction 
in America that does not recognize a cause of action for negli-
gently inflicted emotional distress. 
The problem lies in the fact that this Court has never 
directly addressed the issue of whether a plaintiff may recover 
damages for negligently inflicted emotional distress. The 
dictum announced in Jeppsen and reiterated in Samms has never 
been questioned, analyzed, or studied. Today, it stands 
7In Oregon, for example, the Impact Rule would still have 
allowed the plaintiff in Reiser to recover because she was the 
direct victim of the defendant's tortious activity even though 
not physically impacted by the defendant's conduct. Harris, 721 
P.2d at 840. 
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abandoned though never accepted; and in its place, an even more 
anachronistic rule has emerged in Reiser. The mere passing of 
time, however, should not overshadow the fact that this dictum 
is, and was, dictum: 
Dictum thrice repeated is still dictum. It is a 
court's statement on a question not necessarily 
involved in the case and, hence, is without force of 
adjudication. It is not controlling as precedent. 
Town of Chino Valley v. City of Prescott, 638 P.2d 1324, 1327 
(1981) (citations omitted). 
Jeppsen, Samms, and Reiser simply perpetuate a Nineteenth 
Century notion that has been uniformly rejected on two conti-
nents. The Impact Rule has been rejected by both of the courts 
that originally articulated it. This Court should therefore 
utilize the opportunity presented by this appeal to carefully 
question, thoughtfully study, and directly address the cir-
cumstances under which a plaintiff may recover damages for 
negligently inflicted emotional distress in Utah. In so doing, 
this Court should adopt the superior and majority approach 
embodied in the Foreseeability Rule. In the words of the Ohio 
Supreme Court: 
Today, this court has the unique opportunity to 
establish standards in this ever evolving area of tort 
law. To our credit, we need not experience the slow, 
cynical recognition of an individual•s right to 
emotional tranquillity; other jurisdictions have both 
the experiences and illustrations which aid us in 
adopting a course which brings our law securely in 
step with the modern advances made in medical and 
psychiatric science. While some may view our decision 
today as an unsettling quantum leap into this dif-
ficult area of the law, the situation is one of 
paramount necessity in fitting the law to the dynamics 
and nuances of modern twentieth century society. We 
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view our decision today as a bold and promising step 
in ensuring an individual's right to emotional 
tranquillity which is redressable in an action against 
a blameworthy defendant for the negligent infliction 
of serious emotional distress. 
Paugh, 451 N.E.2d at 762-63. 
VI. Objections to Recovery 
Historically, five arguments have been raised as grounds 
for denying recovery of damages for negligently inflicted 
emotional distress: 
They are [1] medical science's supposed difficulty in 
proving causation between the claimed damages and the 
alleged fright, [2] the fear of fraudulent or exagger-
ated claims, [3] the concern that to allow such a 
recovery will precipitate a veritable flood of litiga-
tion, [4] the problem of unlimited and unduly burden-
some liability, and [5] the difficulty of reasonably 
circumscribing the area of liability. 
Sinn, 404 A.2d at 678 (numbering added). 
Each argument will be addressed hereafter8 despite the fact 
that, in the words of Professor Prosser, fl[a]ll these objections 
have been answered many times, and it is threshing old straw to 
deal with them." Law of Torts § 54, at 360. 
a. Medical science is able to supply a causal link between the 
psychic damage suffered by the bystander and the shock or fright 
attendant to having witnessed the accident. 
Even before the tort of negligently inflicted emotional 
distress was recognized, it was "assumed that medical science 
[was] unable to establish that the alleged psychic injuries in 
fact resulted from seeing a gruesome accident." Sinnf 404 A.2d 
8The subheadings used hereafter have been taken verbatim 
from Sinn. 
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at 678. Professor Leibson has pointed out that this assumption 
flwas certainly a product of its time" and stated: 
It was a time when medical science, especially that 
branch concerned with the study of emotions, was in 
its infancy. The courts regarded with suspicion com-
plainants who experienced no physical injuries but who 
maintained they suffered grievous emotional damage. 
At that time, there was no assurance that psychiatric 
study had become sophisticated enough to satisfac-
torily establish a cause and effect relationship 
between the injury and the incident which allegedly 
gave rise to it. Indeed, courts were reluctant even 
to recognize the existence of damages in such a case 
because, at that time, there was no universal accep-
tance of the fact that emotional problems could be 
triggered by a single event and that, with care and 
treatment, they could be cured. The medical profes-
sion itself gave such an idea little thought. For a 
long time, insanity and other emotional illnesses were 
considered to be the result of one's owns sins. 
Leibson, Recovery of Damages for Emotional Distress Caused by 
Physical Iniury to Another, 15 J. Family L. 163, 163-64 (1976-
77) . 
Modern advances in psychiatry have "discredited these hoary 
beliefs.11 Sinn, 404 A. 2d at 678. As one commentator has 
observed: 
The growing competence of medical science in the 
field of psychic injuries has diminished the problems 
of proof in mental distress cases. The development of 
psychiatric tests and the refinement of diagnostic 
techniques has led . . . authorities to conclude that 
science can establish with reasonable medical cer-
tainty the existence and severity of psychic harm. 
[Unfortunately] . . . changes in the law have not kept 
pace with the increased sophistication of psychiatry. 
Special rules created to deal with problems of proof 
that were a legitimate concern in mental distress 
cases 50 years ago have restricted modern courts in 
their handling of these claims. 
63 Geo. L.J. 1179, 1184-85 (1975). 
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Thus, ,f[t]here is no reason to believe that the causal 
connection involved here is any more difficult for lawyers to 
prove or for judges and jurors to comprehend than many others 
which occur elsewhere in the law.11 Niederman v. Brodsky, 261 
A.2d 84, 87 (Pa. 1970). 
b. Bystander recovery will not open the courthouse door to 
fictitious injuries and fraudulent claims. 
The anchor of the American system is that M [c]ourts must 
depend upon the efficacy of the judicial processes to ferret out 
the meritorious from the fraudulent." Dillon, 441 P.2d at 918. 
Any rule which seeks to bar fraud incidently by 
withholding legal protection from all claims, just and 
unjust, employs a medieval technique which, however 
satisfying it may be defendants and defense attorneys, 
is scarcely in keeping with the acknowledged function 
of a modern legal system. 
R. Leflar & L. Sanders, Mental Suffering and Its Consequences— 
Arkansas Law, 7 U. Ark. L. Sch. Bull. 43, 60 (1939). 
Thus, courts today uniformly reject fraud as a ground for 
denying judicial relief. "A contrary position would not only 
exhibit a cynical lack of faith in the entire judicial system, 
but would also penalize the honest because of the potential 
activities of the dishonest." Sinn, 404 A.2d at 679-80 n.ll. 
c. The fear of a flood of similar litigation is an insufficient 
reason to deny bystander recovery. 
Historically, courts have assumed that permitting recovery 
for negligently inflicted emotional distress would cause them to 
"be swamped by an avalanche of cases." Knaub v. Gotwaltf 220 
A.2d 646, 647 (Pa. 1966). This rationale is inherently delud-
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ing, for "if the only purpose of our law was to unburden the 
court system, then we would reach the zenith of judicial 
achievement simply by closing the district courts to all 
litigants and allowing all wrongs to come to rest on innocent 
victims.11 Gates, 719 P.2d at 197. 
The Dillon court corrected this error by pointing out "that 
courts are responsible for dealing with cases on their merits, 
whether there be few suits or many; the existence of a multitude 
of claims merely shows society's pressing need for legal 
redress." 441 P.2d at 917 n.3. In the words of Professor 
Prosser: "It is the business of law to remedy wrongs that 
deserve it, even at the expense of a 'flood of litigation1; and 
it is a pitiful confession of incompetence on the part of any 
court of justice to deny relief upon the ground that it will 
give the court too much work to do." Prosser, Intentional 
Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 Mich. L. Rev. 
874, 877 (1939). 
Although these statements are undeniably correct, it may 
nevertheless be fortunate for the public fisc that the under-
lying assumption that courts would be swamped with cases has 
proven to be misguided. "[T]hose courts which have relaxed 
their limitations on recovery of this type have not experienced 
any substantial increase in litigation." Negligent Infliction 
of Mental Distress: Reaction to Dillon v. Legg in California 
and Other States, 25 Hastings L.J. 1248, 1250 (1974). As 
Professor Prosser noted: 
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[T]he law is not for the protection of the physically 
sound alone. It is the business of the courts to make 
precedent where a wrong calls for redress, even if 
lawsuits must be multiplied; and there has long been 
precedent enough, and no great increase in litigation 
has been observed. 
Law of Torts § 54, at 360 (emphasis added). 
d. Bystander recovery would not present a problem of unlimited 
or unduly burdensome liability. 
It has previously been explained that the Foreseeability 
Rule properly limits the class of plaintiffs to those claimants 
who fall within the scope of the modified factors listed in 
Dillon. Carefully applied, these factors reliably predict the 
reasonably foreseeable results of a defendant's negligent 
conduct. In the words of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court: 
In considering the wisdom of extending civil liability 
for tortious conduct, courts have been inclined to 
impose a duty where public policy demands that "as 
between the tortfeasor who started the chain of 
circumstances resulting in the injury and the entirely 
innocent plaintiff, the tortfeasor should suffer the 
consequences.ff 
Sinn, 404 A.2d at 681 (quoting Comment, Bystander Recovery for 
Mental Distress, 37 Fordham L. Rev. 429, 449 (1969)). 
Thus, the argument becomes compelling that "[t]he more 
complex and interwoven societal relations become the greater the 
responsibility one must accept for his or her conduct." 404 
A. 2d at 681. It should be noted, however, that the fear of 
unlimited liability can be tailored under the Foreseeability 
Rule to allay the fears of those who face claims for negligently 
inflicted emotional distress. The Hawaii Supreme Court, for 
example, has limited recovery under the Foreseeability Rule "to 
30 
claims of serious mental distress." Leona v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 
758, 764 (Hawaii 1974) (emphasis added). 
Certainly the law should not compensate for every 
minor psychic shock incurred in the course of daily 
living; it should not reinforce the neurotic patterns 
of our society. At some point, however, a person 
threatened by severe mental injury should be able to 
enforce his claim to reasonable psychological tran-
quillity. 
D'Ambra, 338 A.2d at 529. 
e, It is possible to reasonably circumscribe the area of 
liability. 
This concern was dispelled by the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court: 
We are confident that the application of the tradi-
tional tort concept of foreseeability will reasonably 
circumscribe the tortfeasor's liability in such cases. 
Foreseeability enters into the determination of 
liability in determining whether the emotional 
injuries sustained by the plaintiff were reasonably 
foreseeable to the defendant. 
Sinn, 404 A.2d at 684. 
In this context, we are satisfied that the develop-
ments in the fields of medical science and psychiatry 
do provide the impetus for expanding our legal 
recognition of the consequences of the negligent act. 
To arbitrarily refuse to recognize a now demonstrable 
injury flowing from a negligent act would be wholly 
indefensible. 
Id. at 683. 
The Foreseeability Rule fully embodies the notion that this 
area of the law must be reasonably circumscribed, for liability 
is only extended to the reasonably foreseeable results of a 
defendant's negligent conduct. The factors enumerated under the 
Foreseeability Rule illustrate the perpetual evolution of the 
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common law in its effort to keep abreast of change and progress. 
This Court should utilize the opportunity presented by this 
appeal to update Utah's approach to negligently inflicted 
emotional distress. In this regard, the words of the Missouri 
Supreme Court when it adopted the Foreseeability Rule are 
persuasive: 
A painstaking review of this whole subject has 
convinced this court that the time has come for 
Missouri to join the mainstream of Anglo-American 
jurisprudence by abandoning the classic impact rule. 
Bass, 646 S.W.2d at 772. 
The Colorado Supreme Court has stated: ff[W]hile recogniz-
ing the importance of stare decisis to our system of juris-
prudence, we note at the same time that the strength of the 
common law has always been its responsiveness to the changing 
needs of society." 
The time has come for the dictum uttered in Jeppsen to be 
studied, reformed, and modernized. This Court should adopt the 
majority approach embodied in the Foreseeability Rule and 
overrule the trail of dictum that began in Jeppsen and ended in 
Reiser, for this dictum has evolved into an unprecedented rule 
of law. In the words of the Hawaii Supreme Court: 
Blind adherence to legal rules constitutes an abroga-
tion of the judicial function. Such blind adherence 
may result as much from adoption of a rule without 
adequate analysis as from application of a precedent 
without examination of its claim to validity. Legal 
rules should result from, rather than be a substitute 
for, legal analysis. Judicial rumination of ideas in 
the multitude of factual circumstances gives birth to 
rules. And continued rumination insures that such 
rules will be applied only as long as they serve the 
function for which they were designed. 
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Columbia Casualty Co, v. Hoohuli, 437 P. 2d 99, 104 (Hawaii 
1968). 
This Court should therefore conclude that negligently 
inflicted emotional distress is actionable in Utah under the 
Foreseeability Rule. 
CONCLUSION 
The Foreseeability Rule is a logically sound and modern 
approach, and should be adopted by this Court as the applicable 
rule for granting relief to those who suffer severe emotional 
injuries by reason of another's negligence. Dicta in prior 
decisions of this Court to the contrary should be overruled. 
The trial court's judgment of dismissal should be reversed, and 
this case remanded for trial. 
DATED this 10th day of February, 1988. 
JACKSON HOWARD, 
TRED D. HOWARD, and 
LESLIE W^ SLAUGH, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing were mailed to the following, postage prepaid, this 
10th day of February, 1988. 
Ray Phillips Ivie 
IVIE & YOUNG 
48 North University Ave. 
P. 0. Box 672 
Provo, Utah 84603 
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JACKSON HOWARD and 
FRED D. HOWARD, for: 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
120 East 300 North Street 
P.O. Box 778 
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Telephone: (801)373-6345 
ISO? JAN - 8 FH to 2 7 
OurTiTFNbT 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JESSE BROWN, by and through 
his guardian ad litem, 
JEFFERY BROWN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KEVIN K. LOH, JOSEPH PLUTA, 
NORMAN LIWANAG, EUGENE LONG, 
AND THOMAS M. FOLEY, d/b/a 
THE KNIGHT BLOCK PARTNERSHIP, 
a Hawaii General Partnership, 
Defendants. 
COMPLAINT 
civil NO. CM ff7 3 7 
COMES NOW the plaintiff and complains of the defendants and for cause of 
action allege: 
1. Plaintiff is a resident of Utah County, State of Utah. 
2. The plaintiff, Jeffery Brown is the father and guardian ad litem of 
Jesse Brown, a minor child, and this is an action for damages pursuant to Rule 17 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
3. Plaintiff is without information as to the residents of the defen-
dants, Kevin K. Loh, Joseph Pluta, Norman Liwanag, Eugene Long and Thomas M. Foley, 
d/b/a The Knight Block Partnership, a Hawaii General Partnership, but alleges that 
its principal place of business is in Provo, Utah County, Utah; and that said 
partnership does own and operate the property which gives rise to this lawsuit. 
4. On or about the 2nd day of August, 1986, the plaintiff, Jesse Brown 
witnessed the injury and death of the decedent Jody Quinn who was killed in defen-
dants' building referred to as the Knight Block, in an elevator shaft and by 
mechanisms owned and controlled by the defendants. 
5. At all times herein mentioned said defendants were the owners and 
operators of the Knight Block Building and the elevator therein contained. 
6. The defendants hereto failed to maintain and safeguard the said 
elevator in a manner that would prevent its use by children at a time when it knew 
that the elevator was defective and attractive to children. 
7. Said defendants knew or should have known that children were attracted 
to the building in question; that they used the elevator for recreational purposes 
and were naturally and inherently curious about its methods of operation. 
8. On August 2, 1986, Jody Quinn, in the company of his friend, plaintiff 
Jesse Brown, were attracted to the elevator for recreational purposes and for a 
period of approximately two hours rode the elevator up and down and became curious 
about the manner in which the elevator operated mechanically. 
9. The nature of the operation of the elevator was such that a child 
could satisfy his curiosity concerning the internal operation of the elevator by 
wedging himself between the cage door and the access door to the elevator so as to 
allow the elevator to proceed to another level while the child remained at the 
floor level so as to be in the shaft itself after the elevator ascended. 
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10. The defendant Knight Block knew or should have known that this was 
possible and that a child could satisfy his curiosity regarding the operation of 
the elevator in this manner but that to do so would expose the child to ultimate 
risk. 
11. On the day in question the two boys did perform exactly that which 
could have been foreseen by the defendants, such that in operating the elevator, the 
decedent Jody Quinn became caught in between the two doors in such a way as to be 
crushed by the elevator itself, resulting in his death; and all of which was 
witnessed by the plaintiff, Jesse Brown, and which served to injure and traumatize 
him, and cause severe emotional distress to him to his general and special damage. 
12. The defendants hereto were negligent in the manner in which they 
maintained, operated, guarded and cared for the said elevator and in their failure 
to warn users of the potential risks and hazards inherent in its operation. 
13. By reason of the negligence of the defendants, the plaintiff has 
sustained great pain and suffering; and has incurred hospital and medical expenses, 
the exact amount of which is unknown at this time, but for which plaintiff shall be 
entitled to recover upon proof. 
14. The plaintiff has sustained general damages, the exact amount of 
which is unknown at this time, but for which the plaintiff is entitled to recover 
upon proof. 
15. The plaintiff is entitled to interest pursuant to statute upon all 
special damages incurred from the date of injury. 
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RAY PHILLIPS IVIE, #3657 
IVIE & YODNG 
Attorneys for Defendants 
48 North University Avenue 
P. 0. Box 672 
Provo, Utah 84603 
375-3000 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JESSE BROWN, by and through 
his guardian ad litem, 
JEFFERY BROWN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KEVIN K. LOH, JOSEPH PLUTA, 
NORMAN LIWANAG, EUGENE LONG, 
and THOMAS M. FOLEY, d/b/a 
THE KNIGHT BLOCK PARTNERSHIP, 
a Hawaii General Partnership, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. CV-87-37 
Judge Park 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly and duly 
for hearing before the above-entitled court on the 28th day of 
August, 1987, on defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Attorney Fred 
D. Howard appeared as counsel for plaintiff. Attorney Ray 
Phillips Ivie appeared as counsel for defendants. 
The matter having been submitted to the Court upon 
written briefs and oral argument and the Court now being fully 
advised in the matter, makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Plaintiff brings this action against defendants to 
recover for negligently inflicting emotional injury. 
The Court having found as above set forth, now makes 
and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A cause of action for emotional distress may not be 
based upon mere negligence. See Reiser v. Lohner 641 P.2d 93. 
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment 
dismissing plaintiff's action with prejudice. 
DATED AND SIGNED this /O day of September, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
BOYD'L. PARK, Judge 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
/ 
sr 
with postage prepaid thereon, this 
1987, to: 
Jackson Howard, Esq. 
Fred Howard, Esq. 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North 
P. 0. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
day of September, 
/ / 
\\h ktfQJQ 
Secretary 
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RAY PHILLIPS IVIE, #3657 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Defendants 
48 North University Avenue 
P. 0. Box 672 
Provo, Utah 84603 
375-3000 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
y 
JESSE BROWN# by and through 
his guardian ad litem, 
JEFFERY BROWN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KEVIN K. LOHf JOSEPH PLUTA, 
NORMAN LIWANAG, EUGENE LONG, 
and THOMAS M. FOLEY, d/b/a 
THE KNIGHT BLOCK PARTNERSHIP, 
a Hawaii General Partnership, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT J 
Civil No. CV-87-37 
Judge Park 
The Court having heretofor made and entered Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now makes and enters the 
following: 
JUDGMENT 
Defendants are hereby awarded judgment against 
plaintiff as a matter of law, no cause for action. Plaintiff's 
Complaint on file herein is dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED AND SIGNED this /P day of September, 1987, 
BY THE COURT: 
Vi rf^<r^ 
BOYD X. PARK / Judge 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Judgment with postage prepaid 
thereon, this / day of September, 1987, to: 
Jackson Howard, Esq. 
Fred Howard, Esq. 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North 
P. 0. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
jdu 
Secretary "^" r 
- 2 -
